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REPLY 
Medical Civil Rights as a Site of Activism: A 
Reply to Critics 
Craig Konnoth* 
My respondents, Allison Hoffman, and Rabia Belt and Doron Dorfman, 
generously wrote their responses to my Article, Medicalization and the New 
Civil Rights as the nation lurched from crisis to crisis.1 Their responses were 
written in the throes of the onslaught of COVID-19, the effects of which were 
concentrated on those who were already vulnerable. With the epidemic still 
raging, protests broke out over the killing of George Floyd. We live in a time 
when the law seems to have failed those seeking justice—and we are casting 
about for alternatives.2  
 Enter medical civil rights. In the context of the Floyd murder itself, 
Minneapolis City Council Vice President Andrea Jenkins, the first openly 
transgender Black woman elected to public office in the United States, argued 
that racism should be declared a public health emergency.3 Analogizing racism 
to “cancer,” she argued, “[u]ntil we name this virus [i.e. racism], we will never, 
ever resolve this issue.”4 The Cleveland City Council’s Health and Human 
Services committee met virtually (in light of the COVID-19 epidemic) to 
discuss a resolution declaring “Racism as a Public Health Crisis.”5 The President 
of the American Psychological Association similarly argued, “[w]e are living in 
a racism pandemic, which is taking a heavy psychological toll on our African 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado School of Law. My thanks to Aziza 
Ahmed, Jessica Clarke, Ruth Colker, Allison Hoffman, and Michael Stein for comments, 
on extremely short notice. 
 1. Rabia Belt & Doron Dorfman, Response, Reweighing Medical Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. 
REV. ONLINE 176 (2020); Allison K. Hoffman, Response, How Medicalization of Civil 
Rights Could Disappoint, 72 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 165 (2020). 
 2. Cf. Monica C. Bell, Police Reform and the Dismantling of Legal Estrangement, 126 YALE L. 
J. 2054 (2017) (describing legal estrangement in police contexts).  
 3. Minneapolis City Council Official Calls for Racism to be Declared a Public Health Emergency, 
AXIOS (May 28, 2020), https://perma.cc/7N3K-7ULM. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Racism as a Public Health Crisis Virtual Meeting, CLEVELAND CITY COUNCIL (May 30, 
2020), https://perma.cc/2THA-RM9W.  
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American citizens.”6 Over 130 localities and states declared racism a public 
health emergency, including the states of Michigan, Wisconsin, Nevada, and 
the localities of Boston, Denver, Columbus, Cook County, Pittsburgh, 
Minneapolis, Memphis, and Dallas, the vast majority doing so this past 
summer.7 Many, therefore, continue to diagnose civil rights problems and their 
solutions using medical frames. Are these policymakers, backed by activists, 
wrong to do so? The answer, according to legal scholarship that has explicitly 
considered the question, seems to be yes.8  
 My ambitions are, in some ways, modest. I simply argue that while the legal 
scholarship has emphasized the harms of using medical discourse, it has not 
explicitly considered its benefits across social movements—and there are 
several. Rather than suggest that these activists have miscalculated, I seek to 
understand why activists and policymakers have deployed medical frames. 
Further, recognizing that medical discourse and the rights—and burdens—it 
produces are malleable, I seek to explore ways in which to further its social 
justice possibilities.  
For some actors, however, the costs may still outweigh the benefits, and 
my interlocutors perform a valuable task in elucidating their perspective. Those 
calculations may change, not just from group to group, but from individual to 
individual, and there is substantial disagreement within groups.9 Our 
conversation is part of a broader one among various disciplines, including 
medical humanities, disability theory, and health policy. While historically the 
relationship between at least some of these disciplines, particularly medical 
humanities and disability theory, was “tense and distant,”10 as this engagement 
represents, the scholarship has moved in the direction of “bridge-building” and 
“cross-pollinat[ion].”11  
To further that end I focus on three main questions: What benefits does 
medicalization provide, who is involved in offering and receiving the benefits, 
and why do medical frames provide these benefits? But before I do any of that, 
I address a fundamental question on which there is significant confusion—what 
is “medicalization”?  
 
 6. ‘We Are Living in a Racism Pandemic,’ Says APA President, AM. PSYCH. ASS’N (May 29, 
2020), https://perma.cc/NZB5-HEQF. 
 7. Declarations of Racism as a Public Health Issue, AM. PUB. HEALTH ASS’N, 
https://perma.cc/KK89-CQP7 (archived Dec. 3, 2020). 
 8. See Craig Konnoth, Medicalization and the New Civil Rights, 72 STAN. L. REV. 1165, 1202-
08 (2020). 
 9. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 78-83 (discussi ng diverse approaches to the 
transgender movement and diagnoses).  
 10. Carol Thomas, Medical Sociology and Disability Theory, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE 
SOCIOLOGY OF CHRONIC AND DISABLING CONDITIONS: ASSAULTS ON THE LIFEWORLD 
44 (Graham Scambler & Sasha Scambler eds., 2010) [hereinafter NEW DIRECTIONS].  
 11. Simon J. Williams, The Biopolitics of Chronic Illness: Biology, Power and Personhood, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 10, at 205, 207; Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1171. 
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I. What is Medicalization? 
One fundamental concern Belt and Dorfman raise goes to the concept of 
medicalization. They argue, both at the beginning and at the end of their 
response, that by supporting medicalization, I am advancing an “older model of 
disability advocacy” that “perpetuate[s] dependency and charity,” that shifts 
power from patients to experts, and that results in societal alienation.12 In 
particular, they suggest that I am advancing the “medical aspects” of disability, 
rather than the “social model.”13  
The distinction they offer, presumably, tracks that of the “medical” and 
“social” model of disability that the Article describes at length.14 Roughly 
speaking, in cases of disability, the medical model requires changes and “cures” 
to the bodily traits of the person experiencing disability, while the social model 
suggests changes to social circumstances that render the trait disabling—thus, 
instead of forcing a cochlear implant on an individual, as the medical model 
requires, the social model requires accessible signing services.  
In their treatment of the medical and social models, Belt and Dorfman do 
not mention the Article’s discussion, so I cannot claim this for sure—but I 
suspect our disagreement is terminological. By partially defending medical 
discourse, I do not defend the medical model, as medical discourse and “medical 
model” in disability theory are not the same thing. Disability theory uses the 
phrase “medical model” to describe an archetype; it is a term of art that imagines 
a solely biological approach to curing disability, thus emphasizing the harmful 
possibilities of medicine.15 But the on-the-ground reality of modern medicine 
has increasingly moved away from this sole reliance on biology, thanks in large 
part to the work of disability activists. Indeed, as the Article explains, medical 
frames today seek to advance structural solutions, such as housing and anti-
racism efforts.16 Medical discourse, today at least, deals heavily with the “social 
environment”; the “medical model” does not.17 Conceptualizing medicine as 
involving only a certain kind of medical professional exercising biological 
authority imagines an ideal type of western medicine, embedded at a certain 
point in history.18 The “medicalization” that Belt and Dorfman target is 
 
 12. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 177-78, 184. 
 13. Id. at 187. See generally Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability 
Perspective, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1415 (2013) (describing the importance of 
structural solutions to achieve anti-subordination).  
 14. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1180 n.58. 
 15. Id.  
 16. See, e.g., id. at 1197.  
 17. Indeed, many disability scholars today protest the biological-social dichotomy as not 
reflecting lived experience, as the original Article notes, and I disavow that I am 
making claims regarding biological situatedness, explicitly, either way. Id.  
 18. See Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1255 n.476.  
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therefore a faux ami—or perhaps, a faux enemi; it is not the purely biologically 
based medical model that they rightly question.  
In understanding how medicine came to look to (some) structural 
solutions, it is important to understand that medicine is a social discourse, 
shaped by time and place and by those who invoke it. For most of human 
history—from the ancient Greeks to well into the nineteenth century—
medicine was generally understood as an art that sought to maintain the balance 
of bodily “humors” or fluids.19 Both behavior, and (with Christianity’s arrival) 
sin, determined how the humors were balanced, but with some groups—racial 
minorities, women, the poor—the humors were always out of sync.20 This 
meant that the fault for medical harm lay within the bodies or soul. 
The twentieth century has generally abstracted medical fault away from the 
body through a process that has invited controversy and turmoil. First, the 
germ theory of the late nineteenth century meant that individuals were not 
solely responsible for ill health—tuberculosis, for example, was proven not to 
be the result of an imbalance in the humors, but rather the result of germs. 
Eugenic arguments remained—germs there may be, but the weak constitutions 
of certain individuals caused them to succumb; indeed, some eugenicists 
opposed public health programs so that those weakly constituted would die.21  
Mid-century approaches turned to technical, biological remedies, and the 
focus was on professionals imposing cures on the patient.22 This is the period 
which Belt and Dorfman highlight—they rely heavily on the work of pioneering 
medical sociologist Talcott Parsons, who emphasized the stunted power 
dynamics between doctor and patient.23 Subsequent sociologists and disability 
scholars have criticized Parsons’s observations as representing an “ideal type,” 
and an “abstract hypothetical construct” (much like the medical model),24 and 
have argued that patients often occupied “active,” rather than “passive” roles 
even then.25 In any case, Parson’s observations were made in 1951—twenty 
 
 19. See Craig Konnoth, Medical Stereotypes 10 (May 8, 2020) (unpublished manuscript) (on 
file with author). 
 20. Id. at 11. 
 21. Martin S. Pernick, Eugenics and Public Health in American History, 87 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 
1767, 1767 (1997). 
 22. See Nancy Krieger, Epidemiology and Social Sciences: Towards a Critical Reengagement in 
the 21st Century, 22 EPIDEMIOLOGIC REVS. 155, 159 (2000) (“[T]he bulk of early- to mid-
20th century US epidemiologic inquiry either ignores social factors or treats them as 
nuisance variables encountered en route to ascertaining the ‘true’ etiology (read 
‘biological causes’) of disease”).  
 23. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 183 & nn.40-44.  
 24. Kathy Charmaz, Studying the Experience of Chronic Illness through Grounded Theory, in 
NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 10, at 8, 14; Carl May, Retheorizing the Clinical Encounter: 
Normalization Processes and the Corporate Ecologies of Care, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra 
note 10, at 129, 131.  
 25. Graham Scrambler & Sasha Scrambler, Introduction: The Sociology of Chronic and 
Disabling Conditions, Assaults on the Lifeworld, in NEW DIRECTIONS, supra note 10, 
at 1, 2. 
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years before the birth of the bioethics movement, and forty before mainstream 
medical (re-)engagement with social determinants of health.  
Starting in the 1970s, the bioethics movement began in earnest, 
emphasizing the importance of informed consent and patient participation.26 
Further, while technical remedies have remained important, at least since the 
early 2000s, researchers have refocused their energies on so-called social 
determinants of health, which continued some threads of public health work 
from nearly a century before.27 On this account, both material- and status-
based factors in one’s environment such as housing, employment, financial, 
family, social, and educational circumstances, all affect health.28 It has only been 
in the last two decades or so, however, that efforts have begun in earnest to 
address these social determinants,29 and some—such as racism, as the Article 
describes—are still being understood.30 
As a procedural matter, bioethics has thus begun the task of seeking 
participatory justice. As a substantive matter, social determinants emphasize 
substantive goals involving equity. That bifurcated understanding can frame 
several movements that, in turn, affected the social role of medicine.  
In the 1970s, for example, psychiatrists who became embedded in Vietnam 
veteran organizations “as peers”—that is, as fellow activists, rather than as 
distanced professionals—successfully pushed for Post-Traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) to be recognized as an after-effect of combat.31 As the 
Veterans Administration notes today, this meant that “the significant change 
ushered in by the PTSD concept was the stipulation that the etiological agent 
was outside the individual (i.e., a traumatic event) rather than an inherent 
individual weakness.”32 Participatory justice thus achieved substantive justice—
the profession realized that society, rather than the individual, was responsible 
for trauma.  
As medical sociologists describe, other movements—such as the breast 
cancer movement—built on these techniques seeking to emphasize social 
structures in medical narratives.33 The Article goes on to describe in detail how 
 
 26. See Olubukunola Mary Tawose, The Legal Boundaries of Informed Consent, 10 AM. MED. 
ASS’N J. ETHICS 521, 522 (2008). 
 27. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1196.  
 28. Jeff Niederdeppe, Q. Lisa Bu, Porismita Borah, David A. Kindig & Stephanie A. 
Robert, Message Design Strategies to Raise Public Awareness of Social Determinants of Health 
and Population Health Disparities, 86 MILBANK Q. 481, 482-83 (2008). 
 29. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1196. 
 30. Id. at Part IV.B.2.  
 31. Konnoth, supra note 19, at nn.423-29 and accompanying text.  
 32. Matthew J. Friedman, PTSD History and Overview, U.S. DEP’T OF VETERANS AFFS., 
https://perma.cc/7FUW-AU52 (archived Dec. 3, 2020). 
 33. MAREN KLAWITER, THE BIOPOLITICS OF BREAST CANCER: CHANGING CULTURES OF 
DISEASE AND ACTIVISM, 165-168 (2008) (discussing how the women’s breast cancer 
movement built directly on the AIDS movement). 
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today, lay individuals participate in medical narratives and knowledge making 
more than ever before. I discuss how medical social movements have shaped 
diagnoses, how “[p]atients and former patients . . . ‘sit on state mental health 
councils, work for mental health agencies, and serve on treatment policy 
committees,’” and engage with Institutional Review and governance boards of 
medical institutions.34 I explain how outside medical institutions, lay 
individuals shape medical discourse through numerous means, far beyond the 
reach of the medical profession.  
As a result, interventions are evolving. Insurance—from Medicaid to 
insurers like Aetna—seek to promote social and structural remedies like 
housing, to some degree at least.35 Provider groups are hiring social workers to 
connect patients to remedies that would historically be considered non-
medical.36 These changes are desirable. Disability scholar Sam Bagenstos 
discusses some of these changes in explaining how disability activists on the 
ground rely on “the assistance and endorsement of professionals.”37 He sees the 
incorporation of non-medical professions as de-medicalization—but I see it 
rather as the influence of the disability movement on medicine, precisely what 
disability theorists have called for.38  
This discussion in the Article shows that medical discourse, in practice, 
increasingly reflects Belt and Dorfman’s understanding of disability as 
“formulated through a complex interaction between the impairment and the 
social environment.”39 Many of these achievements derive from the efforts of 
lay actors. Belt and Dorfman are concerned that the Article seeks to “tak[e] the 
expertise and decisionmaking capacity away from patients and disabled 
individuals and hand[] it over to other experts to make decisions for them.”40 
But my Article applauds, at length,41 the “‘resistance and self-defense against’ 
coercive medical institutions” within medical discourse and the development of 
“patient ‘counter-expertise’” both inside institutions and in society more 
 
 34. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1253 (quoting Nancy Tomes, From Outsiders to Insiders: The 
Consumer-Survivor Movement and Its Impact on U.S. Mental Health Policy 113, in PATIENTS 
AS POLICY ACTORS (Beatrix Hoffman, Nancy Tomes, Rachel Grob & Mark Schlesinger 
eds., 2011)). 
 35. AMANDA CASSIDY, HEALTH AFFS., MEDICAID AND PERMANENT SUPPORTIVE HOUSING 2 
(Oct. 14, 2016), https://perma.cc/5BEM-JE3Z; AETNA, PROMOTING HEALTH EQUITY 
FOR LOW-WAGE WORKERS: HOW EMPLOYERS CAN REDUCE HEALTH CARE COSTS, 
INCREASE PRODUCTIVITY AND HELP EMPLOYEES STAY HEALTHY 4 (2019), 
https://perma.cc/QBG4-B5U5. 
 36. See Lindsey Getz, Accountable Care Organizations: Social Work’s Impact on an Emerging 
Model, SOCIAL WORK TODAY, Mar. 2015, at 24. 
 37. SAMUEL R. BAGENSTOS, LAW AND THE CONTRADICTIONS OF THE DISABILITY RIGHTS 
MOVEMENT 22 (2009). 
 38. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1257 n.494. 
 39. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 187. 
 40. Id. at 184.  
 41. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1250-57.  
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generally, that we are seeing today.42 While new understandings of and 
engagement with medical discourse are layered upon older constructs instead 
of fully displacing them, I do not, as my interlocutors worry, seek to advance 
these “older models.”43 Rather, I find hope in new, social, participatory models 
of medicine. 
II. What Benefits Does Medicalization Provide? 
What then, are the benefits that this new world of medicalization brings? 
Hoffman and Belt and Dorfman suggest that the benefits are limited. Hoffman 
suggests that medical civil rights remedies are not structural: they take an 
“individualized patient-centric” approach and focus on changing behavior 
instead of background conditions.44 Belt and Dorfman similarly argue that the 
benefits do not involve “broad-scale social reform.”45  
The issue is one of perspective, and of comparativity. First, as a matter of 
perspective, what is structural change depends on the kinds of structure at issue. 
In some cases, all that happens is that an individual gets a “small-bore item[] 
like [an] ergonomic chair[].”46 Sometimes, an office may get a ramp that 
benefits those with mobility issues, or, for that matter, those pushing a baby 
carriage or hauling a heavy suitcase.47 One level up, there might be change to 
the practices of an entire school district. A level above that, the practices across 
a global company might change.48 But there are also widespread programmatic 
changes: those that provide housing and employment assistance under 
Medicaid, to take one example.49 And indeed, the passage of the Americans 
with Disabilities Act (ADA) itself, along with other statutes that ensure that 
 
 42. Id. at 1250 (quoting Robert A. Nye, The Evolution of the Concept of Medicalization in the 
Late Twentieth Century, 39 J. HIST. BEHAV. SCIS. 115, 124 (2003)). Indeed, the relevant 
Subpart is entitled “Inside medical institutions: Patient empowerment.” Id.  
 43. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 188. I recognize this potential nominal and 
terminological confusion when citing a source on which Belt and Dorfman 
subsequently rely. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1250 n.451; Belt & Dorfman, supra note 
1, at 183-84 nn.45-46 (both citing Maayan Sudai, Revisiting the Limits of Professional 
Autonomy: The Intersex Rights Movement’s Path to De-Medicalization, 41 HARV. J. L. & 
GENDER 1 (2018)).  
 44. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 166, 168. 
 45. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 182. 
 46. Id.  
 47. See Elizabeth F. Emens, Integrating Accommodation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 839, 841, 846 
(2008); Jamie Gold, The ADA on Its 30th Anniversary: Looking Back and Forward, FORBES 
(July 26, 2020, 8:00 AM EDT), https://perma.cc/3E3K-JBT8. 
 48. See, e.g., Alex Thornton, ‘We Are at a Crossroads’–How Microsoft’s Accessibility Team is 
Making an Impact that Will Be Felt for Generations, MICROSOFT (Sept. 25, 2019), 
https://perma.cc/B2LR-ZH83 (providing overview of Microsoft’s accessibility 
initiatives). 
 49. Mary Crossley, Bundling Justice: Medicaid’s Support for Housing, 46 J. L. MED. & ETHICS 
595, 595 (2018) (discussing housing as a medical necessity). 
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numerous individuals across the country can have access to “small-bore” 
benefits, constitutes a vast structural change. Such change, I would posit, is far 
from “granular.”50 
 Next, Belt and Dorfman claim that the “apparent generosity” of disability 
law is “belied” by the reality51—a fact that is, alas, true of civil rights law in 
general. Further, disability—and, more generally, medicalization—designations 
come with costs, such as stigmatization, that the original Article documents 
exhaustively. Here, the comparativity point comes into play: How do the 
medicalization benefits compare to those of previous years—that is, what trend 
is medicalization on—and how do medical rights compare to other kinds of 
rights? 
There is no question that the benefits medicalization provides have 
improved drastically over a relatively short period of time. Social determinants 
of health literature entered the mainstream, on some accounts, in the 1990s.52 
Hoffman alludes to Thomas Frieden’s famous public health pyramid in 
describing public health measures that envisage behavioral change among 
individuals.53 While Hoffman raises concerns that ongoing measures do not 
address the bottom of the pyramid, which refers to the social environment in 
which individuals live, public health measures are indeed moving in that 
direction. Researchers of public health recognize, as Hoffman notes, that 
unhealthy eating is not just about lack of access to food stores—“[i]t is more 
about who has the time and money to exercise and cook,” and “habits developed 
over generations of poverty.”54 And that is why medical programs have recently 
intervened more and more in seeking to support financial, housing, and 
employment assistance, and even cooking classes.55 Similarly, in the context of 
long-term care support, it is clear both that “the notion that social insurance 
should support the medical but not the social aspects of care endures in a deep 
way,” but at the same time, that “Medicaid’s institutional bias has receded in 
favor of home-based care.”56 Things are changing.  
But what about the changes in other areas of law? Changes there seem less 
promising, and in the original Article, I go through a litany of other 
possibilities, from laws prohibiting race and sex discrimination to those 
offering unemployment and housing benefits, which seem to have receded, 
 
 50. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 169. 
 51. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 181.  
 52. ALEC IRWIN & ELENA SCALI, WORLD HEALTH ORG., ACTION ON THE SOCIAL 
DETERMINANTS OF HEALTH: LEARNING FROM PREVIOUS EXPERIENCES 23 (2005), 
https://perma.cc/L39C-EEUF. 
 53. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 167.  
 54. Id. at 168. 
 55. See, e.g., Keith Brannon, Tulane University School of Medicine to Open First-of-Its-Kind 
Teaching Kitchen, TUL. U. (May 9, 2013, 11:00 AM), https://perma.cc/5QUM-L5KK; 
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1197.  
 56. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 172. 
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even as medical frames have advanced more and more rights.57 My claims there 
remain largely unchallenged.58 Hoffman herself notes that civil rights law in 
general suffers from many of the same pathologies that she attributes to medical 
civil rights: Civil rights law “relies increasingly on individual legal claims and 
harms, and structural interventions have become increasingly difficult.”59 Belt 
and Dorfman point to an “updated and nuanced” social conception of rights, but 
do not offer a concrete vehicle through which they can manifest.60 
Medicalization, on my account, is just that vehicle.  
That said, it is true that medicine can “sit on both sides of the law in a 
problematic way”61—it can justify liberty deprivations as well as liberty 
recognition. My point, however, is that the pendulum has shifted over the last 
century from the former to the latter. And now, as law by itself—which also can 
both oppress and liberate—is proving to be a less fecund source for rights, we 
must ensure that the battle within and outside medicine continues to maintain 
its trend.  
Last, Hoffman suggests that in the long run, medicalization might address 
only the “physical manifestations” of discrimination.62 I agree that should there 
be a retrenchment in medical rights such that only physical harms are 
cognizable, it would indeed be problematic. But thanks to concerted efforts, 
medical civil rights have not been limited in that way. To take one example, 
when the ADA was proposed, Jesse Helms and his allies opposed classifying 
mental impairments as disabilities under the Act.63 That attempt was beaten 
back.64 Thus, both the ADA and Social Security programs, among others, cover 
 
 57. Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1168-69, 1213-31; see also id. at 1245 (noting how positive 
rights claims in non-medical contexts are stigmatizing).  
 58. Belt and Dorfman disagree with my claim that the welfare-based predecessors of 
Medicaid treated their claimants worse than Social Security because it was only the 
intent of the Social Security programs to do so, and the actuality is different. Belt & 
Dorfman, supra note 1, at 181 n.29. My Article, however, makes this point. See 
Konnoth, supra note 8, at 1207 (noting “despite these intentions, rather than 
dignifying individuals, these rights can impose various kinds of stigma” and detailing 
stigmatic narratives). Second, in refuting my comparative point, none of their sources 
actually compares Medicaid or its predecessors to Social Security (when Medicaid is 
mentioned at all). Cf. Telephone Interview with Claire Dickson, Supervising Att’y, 
Colo. Legal Aid (Aug. 13, 2020) (noting that on the whole, Medicaid involves more 
intrusion than Social Security, but that it depends on the program at issue). Third, 
they raise concerns about the age of the source I rely on, but it remains the foremost 
comparative account of Medicaid and Social Security.  
 59. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 166. 
 60. Belt & Dorfman, supra note 1, at 187. 
 61. Hoffman, supra note 1, at 170.  
 62. Id. at 165. 
 63. Michael L. Perlin, The ADA and Persons with Mental Disabilities: Can Sanist Attitudes Be 
Undone?, 8 J. L. & HEALTH 15, 27 (1993). 
 64. Id. at 27-28. 
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both “physical or mental” conditions.65 And plaintiffs have obtained concrete 
benefits from claiming that gender identity disorder is a “legitimate mental 
disorder.”66 More recently, in P.P. v. Compton Unified School District, 
litigators focused on the psychological trauma caused by racism, poverty, and 
homelessness.67 To be sure, litigators “detail[ed] the body’s response to trauma” 
including “neurobiological effects” that “affect[] the brain,” but the factual 
allegations based on which the court ruled focus on how psychological harms 
affect behavior.68 The allegation of physical harm, in other words, is 
inseparable from, and arguably flows from many kinds of mental impairments. 
III. Who Is Involved? 
In the first Part, I describe in detail how medical knowledge and framing is 
no longer the province of medical professionals alone. Sociologists like Nikolas 
Rose and Steven Epstein describe at length how lay individuals use medical 
frames as part of their self-understanding—as my Article describes at length, 
these new forms of engagement ground “biosocial organization” through 
phenomena such as the proliferation of medical devices, home medical care, 
and the engagement of other professions in care, as understanding of social 
determinants abounds.69 This means that groups often understand themselves 
in medical terms, and engage in medical activism—including movements that 
pressed for diagnoses including PTSD, Battered Women’s Syndrome, coal 
miners’ lung, and the like.70  
Similarly, today, so-called COVID-19 “long-haulers”—individuals with 
persistent COVID-19 symptoms have “set up their own support groups,” and 
are “running their own research projects, [and] form[ing] alliances with people 
who have similar illnesses, such as . . . chronic fatigue syndrome. A British 
group—LongCovidSOS—launched a campaign to push the government for 
recognition, research, and support.”71 This has led to policy support for 
increased funding for research into the way we measure long-term COVID-19 
outcomes.72  
 Hoffman, however, suggests that non-medical rights claims can more 
directly relate to group identity. Cases that do not (explicitly) include medical 
discourse, like Obergefell v. Hodges, “can . . . quickly translate into group-level 
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benefits and social understandings.”73 Those cases directly target the basis of 
discrimination—homophobia, racism, and sexism—rather than hiding behind 
the “scrim” of medicine.74  
 But part of my claim is that rather than making medical claims 
disingenuously or in ways that are delinked from their realities, the “social 
understandings” of groups about their identities and the discrimination they 
experience are increasingly intertwined with medical narratives. We saw this 
dynamic in Obergefell, where Justice Kennedy relied on medical evidence to 
claim that homosexuality is immutable.75 Similarly, our understanding of race 
is infused with medical understandings: Scholars such as Ruqaiijah Yearby, 
Lindsay Wiley, and myself have argued that medical discourse has the power to 
perpetuate or to help alleviate racism, especially when racism is understood as 
a phenomenon where social determinants of health are denied.76 
Discriminatory phenomena thus have their roots in various narratives of 
power—medicine is often one of them, and advocates may choose to emphasize 
its relationship to their experience.  
The trans rights movement offers perhaps the most compelling example of 
this phenomenon. As Belt and Dorfman note, the ICD-11, which guides the 
diagnoses of all medical professionals, removed gender dysphoria with the 
support of many trans rights organizations.77 But what they leave unsaid is that 
transgender activists see both harms and benefits to complete de-
medicalization,78 and the ICD replaces the term with “gender incongruence” in 
a separate section of the DSM, to maintain access to health services and the 
like.79 Thus, while the claim that trans activists seek to de-pathologize trans 
identity is fair, the suggestion that the ICD “de-medicalizes trans identities” or 
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that that move is “supported by [all?] trans rights organizations,”80 disregards 
diverse approaches in the trans movement, many of which intertwine medicine 
in their narratives of identity. This allows transgender advocates to seamlessly 
include medical civil rights claims in their litigation strategy. For example, as 
counsel of record on an amicus brief in support of the transgender plaintiff in 
Bostock v. Clayton County, in which the Court held in June that Title VII 
prohibited anti-transgender discrimination, I engaged in deep conversations 
with lawyers from my days as an LGBT rights activist about ensuring that either 
in victory or defeat, the viability of ADA-based arguments would not be 
affected.81 As trans rights lawyers would point out, those arguments are still 
important for ongoing cases.82 
Notably, the dynamic here is precisely that which describes medical civil 
rights in general. Medical discourse remains important precisely for access to 
rights and benefits, and members of the relevant group support its engagement. 
At the same time, because of the involvement of members of these groups, 
medical discourse is being used descriptively, without pathologizing. The result 
is the use of medical discourse, but at the same time, in a way that seeks to 
“depathologise and destigmatise the individuals called ‘transgender.’”83 Medical 
categories—pregnancy, genetic susceptibility to certain conditions, or 
categories of individuals at risk for flu—do not pathologize the groups to which 
they refer. Through activism, and broadening consciousness, the goal is to 
extend that approach to other categories.84  
While groups might invoke medical discourse, it is not the case—as Belt 
and Dorfman claim—that I “want[] more people to use medical claiming.”85 To 
the contrary, my Article suggests that, as the explosion in medical civil rights 
claims shows, counter to the consensus in the legal literature, the benefits of 
medical civil rights seeking may outweigh the cost: “[L]ike any litigant, a 
medical civil rights claimant must consider whether, in their particular 
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circumstance, benefits outweigh costs.”86 At the same time, “[t]here is no 
formulaic answer for when this will be the case . . . . The analysis might hinge 
on the legal frame at issue, the condition involved, or personal preference” and, 
as the example of transgender rights shows, individuals in the same group will 
take different tacks.87 Our task going forward, however, is to limit the costs.  
Interestingly, even as Hoffman points to the many advantages of group-
based claims, Belt and Dorfman point to the gatekeeping concerns group claims 
create,88 which plague traditional civil rights groups as well as those who claim 
medicalization discourse.89 Scholars like Bagenstos thus also support universal 
approaches to addressing harm, such as universal healthcare, that remove the 
focus on people with disabilities (and medicalized populations, as well) as 
uniquely needy.90 Indeed, some disability theorists, I note, argue for 
emphasizing that we are all on a “continuous spectrum”—there is no clear line 
between disability and non-disability.91 In the Article, I emphasize that the 
normalcy of medical discourse, as all individuals increasingly understand 
themselves through paradigms mediated by medical devices, genetic profiles, 
and “risk” analyses, can also create a form of “interest convergence.”92 Yes, 
specific groups will continue to agitate for medical rights. But as legal scholar 
Martha Albertson Fineman and medical sociologist Simon Williams have 
argued, our material frailty demonstrates our common “vulnerability,” 
“dependence,”93 and indeed, our humanity.  
IV. Why Do Medical Civil Rights Provide Benefits? 
In the Article, I explain that health policy today often provides medical civil 
rights. My key point—which my respondents do not deny—is that most appear 
to agree that shifting risk for a particular condition upon individuals expresses 
that, at a society-wide level, we assign blame to them for that condition. When 
we relieve risk from them, we are expressing that they should not be blamed 
for that harm. And as I document in detail, American history for the last seventy 
years has—not without the conflict that all social change attracts—involved 
dramatic reduction in medical risk with the passage of social security, the ADA, 
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and the Affordable Care Act.94 While society has shifted risk for other 
misfortunes—poverty, unemployment, and the like—back onto individuals, 
similar attempts in the medical context have failed.95 And when tasks are 
framed as medical, assistance is forthcoming. To take one example from 
Hoffman’s response, as long as long-term care by family members was seen as 
“custodial,” Medicaid did not pay for it; as it began to be framed as medical, 
Medicaid stepped up.96 
I do not deny that scattered exceptions exist—even while these programs 
offered protections for certain conditions, they left certain groups, such as those 
addicted to drugs, smokers, kleptomaniacs, and the like, out of their 
protections.97 But—and I emphasize again—these were exceptions. My 
interlocutors do not deny that the broad rule over the last seventy years has 
been to move risk away from patients. Rather, they seek to add three additional 
exceptions to the list. Even if correct, these exceptions do not disprove the rule, 
but I have concerns even over these claimed exceptions. 
The first example involves the opioid crisis. I follow a swathe of scholars in 
arguing that the medicalization of the opioid epidemic has resulted in a far more 
lenient approach to opioid addicts than to crack addicts who were 
criminalized.98 Hoffman, who questions this conclusion, presents no 
comparative data to counter this comparative claim.99 But she raises two fair 
alternatives to the medicalization explanation for why we blame opioid addicts 
less: (a) we blame doctors more because they were more to blame, and (b) they 
are more likely to be white than crack addicts.100  
On the first possibility, the fact that we appropriately blame doctors has no 
clear bearing on the blame opioid addicts should carry. As Khiara Bridges notes, 
just as opioid addicts were subject to social forces (such as unscrupulous 
doctors) that led to addiction, so too were crack addicts.101 Yet we are more 
likely to blame those social forces in cases involving opioid addiction.  
Second, Hoffman is quite right that the blame game in these respective 
addiction epidemics has a lot to do with race. But, as I explain in a working 
draft, race has a lot to do with medicalization.102 It is harder for Black people to 
medicalize problems in ways that seek rights—a problem I engage with in this 
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separate work—and the issue has to do with the fact that “[t]here is 
discrimination in the way rights are distributed—not just medical rights.”103 
And the issue of race is deeply intertwined with the issue of medicalization.  
Finally, and most importantly, Hoffman does not engage with the 
statements of policymakers I quote that specifically invoke the medicalization 
frame to justify different treatment of opioid and crack addicts.104 The ultimate 
animating factor may be racism, but medicine has the rhetorical and 
legitimizing power to produce the racist outcomes that benefit whites and harm 
Black people. 
Hoffman next argues that the case of undocumented immigrants also shows 
our lack of empathy for harms framed as medical: “medical need could limit 
someone’s ability to come to the United States legally under public charge 
rules.”105 Further, the Trump administration has not released immigrants in 
detention camps under the COVID threat.106 Yet both her points in fact 
demonstrate the power of medicalization. The public charge rules are an 
acknowledgement that we do, as a society, take solicitude of individuals—once 
in this country—when they suffer medical misfortune. Medicalization is not a 
miracle frame—it will not persuade an administration like the current one to do 
justice on all fronts. And yet, on some fronts, it has been surprisingly effective. 
Finally, Belt and Dorfman describe a series of cases at length that showed a 
Court unsympathetic to the ADA, demanding that people, for example, 
“mitigate[]” disabilities.107 I describe these cases only in a footnote108—because 
in 2008, President George W. Bush (in his second term) signed a law, passed by 
unanimous consent in the Senate, overturning these cases.109 That saga appears 
to reinforce my claims regarding the power of medicalization in the halls of 
policy. And while many Americans evince hostility to people living with 
disabilities—as a comparative matter, and given the policy changes I describe, 
attitudes towards medical misfortune in general remain unclear, contextual, 
and complex. When we speak as a society, however, our message is usually 
quite clear. 
Conclusion 
There remains a lot to do. As Belt and Dorfman note, many medical civil 
rights remedies exact harm, and are not as effective as they could be. Medical 
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rights, as the Article admits, are “Janus-faced.”110 And Hoffman quotes my 
claim that “[m]edical claims are malleable [and] contingent . . . social 
phenomena” with concern—medical civil rights can be changed for the 
worse.111 
And yet individuals seek these rights in growing numbers. Indeed, while 
the Trump years have exacted damage across all forms of rights-seeking, the 
longer trend and “broader perspective” of medical rights-seeking has been 
promising.112 The task then, is not to tell individuals, activists, and groups that 
they are wrong, but to seek how to use these rights’ malleability to co-opt, 
shape, and transform medical civil rights to limit their harms and maximize 
their promise. The efforts of scholars and activists—among which the 
scholarship and work of my respondents are among the foremost—have helped 
move the needle in that direction. And we must continue onward. My 
respondents are correct that my Article is a (limited) defense of the 
phenomenon of medical civil rights. But it is more than that. It is also a call to 
arms. 
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